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Residual Wage Inequality in Urban China, 1995-2007 
 
We use three waves of urban household survey data from 1995 to 2007 to investigate the 
trends of residual inequality and its determinants. First, we describe the change of overall 
and residual wage inequality over time. One important new pattern is that the rise in both the 
overall and residual inequality mainly happened at the upper half of the wage distributions 
(i.e. the rich are getting relatively much richer) from 2002 to 2007. From 1995 to 2002, 
however, it is truer to say that the poor are getting relatively much poorer. Second, by using 
two complementary semi-parametric methods, we find that the composition effect is 
negligible. Instead, the change in skill prices plays a dominant role in the rise of residual 
inequality. Finally, by constructing a panel data at the city level, we find that ownership 
restructuring is an important factor that has caused the skill price to rise, especially in the 
earlier period. Another finding is that China’s export share of GDP has a positive effect on the 
enlargement of the upper half distributions. This effect is more significant in the latter period 
from 2002 to 2007, highlighting the impact of China’s entry into the WTO. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
China’s urban wage inequality increased rapidly in the last two decades (Chen and Ravallion, 
2007; Park et. al, 2003). According to the estimates of Li, et. al, (2007), the Gini coefficients of 
urban wages increased from 0.238 in 1988 to 0.364 in 2003, other measures of inequality also 
increased significantly. Not surprisingly, the increase in wage inequality attracts much attention 
(see for example Li and Sato, 2006, Riskin, Zhao, and Li, 2001). 
 
Most of the existing research on China focuses on wage gaps between well defined groups. 
Although the between inequality is important, there are still large proportions of wage variation 
that can’t be explained by those observable characteristics. We define the latter part as residual 
inequality or within inequality. In terms of a standard Mincerian wage equation, where wage (in 
log form) is modeled as a function of education, experience, plus an error term, between 
inequality can be captured by the distribution of these observable characteristics and their 
coefficients, and residual inequality is captured by the error term. It’s well known that the 
explanatory power of variables such as education and experience is seldom more than 30 
percent.
1  Meanwhile, both casual observations and academic research indicate that within 
group difference is becoming more and more manifested both in China (Cai et al, 2010) and 
other countries. Therefore, understanding how the unexplained (residual) part evolves and 
exploring the underlying reasons are important for understanding the overall inequality.  
 
The increase in residual inequality may be due to several reasons. The first and also the most 
important reason is the increase in the price of unobservable skills. Holding the skill 
distribution constant, rise in skill price will increase residual inequality. In fact, the view that 
the increase in unobserved skill price caused the increase in residual inequality is a dominant 
one in U.S. (Juhn, et. al, 1993, Acemoglu, 2002, Katz and Autor, 1999). However, when 
looking more into details of the structure of residual inequality, we may come up with very 
different conclusions. Notice that the overall residual distribution (inequality) is simply the 
results of conditional residual distribution integrated over observable characteristics. Loosely 
speaking, the overall residual inequality is a weighted average of residual inequalities of 
various well defined groups, and the weight is the share of these groups in the whole sample. 
Also notice that within inequalities of different groups are not necessarily identical. Therefore, 
composition change in observable characteristics alone can cause change in the overall residual 
inequality. Taking this into consideration, Lemieux (2006) finds that the increase in residual 
inequality in US is partly due to composition effect. Besides price effect and composition effect, 
                                                               
1 In Cai et al (2010)’s research, the explanatory power of observables in income regressions is around 33%. They include sector, 
occupation, ownership and provincial dummies in their regressions, as well as age, age squared, and education. 3 
 
other factors that may have impact on residual inequality include measurement error, and 
change of unobservable skill distribution (Meng, et al, 2010)
2. What’s the underlying forces 
driving the increase of residual inequality is still hotly debated. 
 
In this paper, we use three waves of urban household survey data from 1995 to 2007, to 
investigate the trends of residual inequality and its determinants. First, we describe overall and 
residual wage inequality in detail. From 2002 to 2007, one important new pattern is that, the rise 
in both the overall and residual inequality mainly happened at the upper half of the wage 
distributions (i.e. the rich are getting much richer). In the former period from 1995 to 2002, 
however, it’s truer o say that the poor are getting relatively much poorer. This phenomenon has 
seldom been studied.  
 
Second, by constructing counterfactual residual wage inequality using two semi parametric 
methods, namely DFL (DiNardo, et al, 1996) and quantile regression based approach (Machado 
and Mata, 2005
3, Angrist, et al, 2004), we explicitly consider the effect of composition change 
on residual inequality. Surprisingly, although skill composition changed significantly, both 
approaches indicate that composition effect is negligible. This result provides empirical support 
for those researches that directly link the change in residual inequality with change in skill price, 
without considering composition effect. We would like to point out the beginning that the price 
effect may include the effect of changes in measurement error and unobservable skill 
distributions. As these two effects are more difficult to address, we don’t make effort to separate 
them out. However, some additional exercises in the latter part of this paper indicate these two 
effects may not be very large.
4  
 
Finally, by construction a panel data at the city level, we find that ownership restructuring is an 
important factor that causing the skill price to rise, especially in the earlier period. This 
explanation is fundamentally different from that for western countries, which emphasizes skill 
biased technological change. At the same time, this result is consistent with most of the existing 
research on China emphasizing the role of institutional change (Zhang et al, 2005, Meng et al, 
2010, Cai et al, 2010). Another finding is that China’s entry into WTO has a positive effect on 
the enlargement of upper half distributions. This finding helps to differentiate this paper from 
the existing ones further. Most of the existing research either simply declined to consider 
globalization as a potential explanatory variable, or dismiss it as unimportant (Zhang et al, 2005 
for example). At this moment, I am only aware of one research that emphasizing globalization’s 
effect on urban inequality, Cai et al, (2010). However, they only use variance as inequality 
measure, and haven’t seen the effect of globalization on different part of the residual 
distribution. By pooling all data from 1992 to 2003 together, they haven’t documented the 
structural change accompanying China’s entry into WTO neither. 
 
                                                               
2 To be more rigorous, there are two types of composition effects. One is due to the change in observable characteristics 
distribution, the other is due to change in distributions of unobservable skills. The first one is our focus in this paper. 
3 We use the terms “MM approach” and “quantile regression based approach” interchangeably.  
4 This can also be thought of as making assumptions that measurement error and unobservable skill distributions haven’t 
change significantly. Given the major transition in terms of education expansion, these assumptions are strong. However, we 
haven’t found significant evidence against these assumptions.  4 
 
Although the research on residual inequality of urban China is relatively few, we’ve already 
seen several notable exceptions. The most recent related researches are Cai et al, (2010) and 
Meng et al (2010). Using the data from the Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(UHIES), Cai et al (2010) decompose the income inequality into between-group inequality and 
within-group inequality. They find within-group inequality accounts for over 60% of the 
overall inequality. They also uncover explanations (economic restructuring, urbanization and 
globalization) for the acceleration of urban inequality. As their focus is on urban income and 
consumption inequality, they don’t consider the price effect versus composition effect issue. 
Meng et al (2010)’s data comes from the same source. But their data covers only 16 provinces 
while that of Cai et al (2010) covers all the provinces. Instead of using a broad income concept 
as in Cai et al, (2010), they consider only earnings income
5. By decomposing the increase in 
earnings overall variance into observable price effect, composition effect and within cell 
variance, they find that within group inequality is the major force that driving up the overall 
earning inequality. However, they don’t consider the composition effect and price effect of 
residual inequality explicitly either. Another common shortcoming of these two studies is that 
their decomposition exercises are based on variance decomposition. While variance is an 
important measure of inequality, it can’t give a complete description if the residual distributions 
are not normal. By using two complementary semi-parametric approaches, we can consider the 
whole distribution of residual distributions. 
 
Two relatively earlier researches are Park et. al, (2003), and Li, et. al, (2007). Park et. al, (2003) 
analyzed the increase of urban wage inequality from 1988 to 1999. They find that there was a 
substantial increase in within-group inequality which is robust to numerous group definitions. 
The returns to unobservable skills as measured by regression residuals explain much of the 
increase in overall inequality. Instead of using directly the methodology proposed by Juhn, 
Pierce, and Murphy (1993) as Park, et. al (2003), Li, et. al, (2007) used the extended JMP 
methods, namely quantile JMP decomposition.
6 Using the same dataset, there’s no surprise that 
they got the same results as Park, et. al, (2003). Compared to these researches, our dataset is 
more recent, which allows to detect some new patterns. Another common shortcoming of these 
researches is their lack of explicit explanation for the rise in skill prices, which is exactly what 
we’ve done in this paper. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes some backgrounds that may 
have effect on (residual) wage distribution and describes our data. Section 3 introduces 
methodologically how we decompose the residual wage inequality. In section 4, we present our 
decomposition results, emphasizing the important role of skill price change in causing the rise 
of residual inequality. In section 5, we aggregate our data at the city level and use fixed effect 
model to see what factors have effect on the change of residual inequality (and also skill prices). 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Background and Data Description 
                                                               
5 The income data Cai et al, (2010) uses include wage earnings, business income, asset income and transfer income, Cai et al, 
(2010, p389).  
6 The quantile JMP decomposition method is proposed by Autor, Katz, and Kearney, (2005).  5 
 
 
2.1 Economic Reform in the Late 1990s and in the New Century 
 
From 1995 to 2007, China witnessed the deepening of reform in the urban areas. There are 
several wonderful works that analyze this process and its impact on the labor market and 
income distributions
7. It’s impossible to give a detailed and comprehensive description of this 
period. In the following, we will summarize three aspects that might have influence on China’s 
urban labor market and therefore inequality.  
 
The first, and maybe the most important one, is the radical ownership restructuring of urban 
sector commenced in 1997. As early as 1992, the central government has setup the goal of 
“establishing socialist market economy”. The reform was stagnant however, with lots of SOEs 
having redundant employment and extremely low profits (or even loss making) in the mid 
1990s (Knight and Song, 2008, p224). The major ownership restructuring happened after 1997. 
On the 15
th National Congress of Communist Party of China, it was reiterated that private sector 
is an important part of our socialist market economy, and that private property right should be 
protected by law. At the same time, the concept of “public ownership” which is essential for 
socialist economy was reinterpreted. The point is that “public ownership” can be realized 
through various ways such as joint ownership, and that China can still be a socialist economy if 
the government controlled large scaled enterprises in key sectors (Jiang, 1997). As a 
consequence, lots of medium and small sized SOEs were privatized through various ways 
including merger, acquisition, and joint ownership. One major part of this restructuring is large 
amount of laid-off or unemployed workers. Most of them were absorbed by the private sector 
subsequently.  
 
For at least three reasons, the restructuring in the late 1990s would have significant effects on 
the wage structure and therefore on residual wage inequality. Firstly, it is well established that 
the public sectors and private sectors have different wage determination mechanisms, with the 
private sector being more market oriented (see Meng, 2000, Dong and Bowles, 2002, Xing, 
2008). As more workers are absorbed by the private sector, the wage structure will change 
consequently. The second reason is that the wage determination mechanism within the public 
sector also evolved, especially after the ownership restructuring. For example, Xing (2007) 
finds that the returns to education in public sectors increased significantly in the late 1990s as 
compared to earlier period. Entering into 21 century, the evolution of wage determination 
mechanisms within the state owned sectors continued. Beginning from around 2003, most 
SOEs performed another round of compensation reform, aiming to make compensations more 
sensitive to work performance. Thirdly and related to the second one, the restructuring in the 
late 1990s created quite a few monopolistic SOEs. Without competitors in the market, most 
SOEs profit much higher. In terms of employment, entering the SOEs is a very selective process, 
and most of the entering labor forces go to the private sector. There’s no severe redundancy 
problem as compared to the 1990s. As a result, the wage gap between SOEs and private sectors 
increased a lot.
8  We’ll investigate how the ownership restructuring affects the residual 
                                                               
7 Comprehensive analysis are summarized in Li and Sato (2006), Riskin, et al, (2001) and Gustafsson, et al, (2009). 
8 Another reform was initiated by State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 6 
 
inequality in an indirect way in section 5. 
 
Another major event at the turn of the century is China’s accession into WTO, which paced up 
China’s globalization process.
9 As a member of WTO, China cut down tariff rate for over 5000 
products in 2002. During the same period, there was substantial trade deregulation, narrowing 
down of scope of quota limits, rising inflow of FDI (Wan et al, 2007). Also, China experienced 
tremendous surge in export following entrance of WTO. Although there have already been 
efforts to relate China’s general globalization process with inequality,
10 little has been done to 
see the effect of China’s entry into WTO.
11  By looking into the whole distribution, and 




The third major event that might affect wage inequality is China’s higher education expansion. 
As documented in Li and Xing (2010), the radical higher education expansion policy 
commenced in 1999 changed dramatically the composition of urban labor force. If different 
education groups have different within-group wage inequalities, the expansion will influence 
the overall residual inequality. This is what we call “composition effect” in the next section. 
However, there may be another type of composition effect that is more subtle but also important. 
The college entrance selection system in China selects those with higher ability into college. 
With the expansion, candidates with relatively lower ability can be admitted into college. 
Without the expansion, they will stay in the high school graduate group. Within the high school 
graduate group, they are in the upper part of the ability or skill distribution. All these mean that 
education expansion will change the distribution of abilities or unobserved skills. Under the 
assumption that unobserved skill distribution is unchanged, the real change will be counted as 
price effect, therefore bias our decomposition results. Fortunately, we don’t find significant 
change in ability distributions.  
 
No doubt, it’s impossible to exhaust all the forces that may have effect on wage inequality 
during this period. We ignore them for several reasons. The first and most important reason is 
data unavailability. Secondly, if these ignored factors are not correlated with both dependent 
and independent variables, ignoring them will not bias our estimates of the relationships 
between other factors and inequalities. Third, some seemingly important phenomenon may 
have little impact on our results. For example, China’s urban labor market experienced huge 
inflow of rural migrants. However, as the labor market is segmented the migrants may have 
little impact on urban residents’ wages (Knight and Yueh, 2004, Liu and Zhao, 2009). As our 
focus here is wage inequality for those with urban hukou, i.e. those officially registered in urban 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
(SASACSC) in 2004. This reform aims at regulate how the CEOs or managers are compensated. 
9 China also witness deepening of globalization in the 1990s. Wan et al, (2007) gave a brief description on China’s journey to 
globalization in terms of trade and tourism, FDI, movement of people. See also Brenstetter and Lardy (2006). 
10 For example, Zhang and Zhang (2003) find that globalization is an important factor contributing to the widening regional 
inequality. However, Wei and Wu (2003) find that greater openness caused declination of rural urban income gap. Another 
paper by Wan et al (2007) also finds that globalization has a decreasing effect on regional inequality. Generally speaking, these 
papers focused on the relationship between globalization and regional disparity, and they used aggregated data.  
11 It’s widely recognized that globalization will have major impact on inequality (Hanson, 2004 on Mexico, Topalova, 2005 on 
India, Attanasio et al, 2003 on Columbia).  
12 More closely related to ours, Cai et al (2010) indicate that both FDI and export have positive effects on within variance as 
well as on overall variance. 7 
 
areas, ignoring this may not affect our results much. Finally, as will be clear in section 5, to 
study the underlying reasons for residual inequality change, we’ll use a fixed effect model at 
city level. This will help us a lot by controlling for many time invariant factors. 
 
2.2 Data and the Trends of (Residual) Wage Inequality in Urban China 
 
In this paper, we use data from the three waves China Household Income Project (CHIP) survey 
in 1995, 2002, and 2007. CHIP data is well known for its high quality and national 
representativeness. In 1995, 2002, and 2007, the urban survey covered 11, 12, and 16 provinces, 
including a wide variety of regions in terms of geography and economic development. 
Although it is not a panel, the coverage of the survey didn’t change much. In 1995 and 2002, the 
survey collected information in the same provinces. The only difference is that Chongqing is 
separated out from Sichuan Province. The survey in 2007 included more provinces while 
retaining those in the previous surveys. Not only most of the provinces are identical, but also 
the cities. Therefore, we can construct a panel data at city level when uncovering the reason of 
rising residual inequality, which allows us to control time-invariant unobservables.  
We keep only those with wage data greater than zero, including both male and female. To focus 
more on the labor market, we use labor income of urban workers, including wages, subsidies 
and labor incomes from other sources. All the income data is deflated into 1995 RMB using the 
national CPI. We first consider the changing patterns of the wage levels and wage inequalities. 
Table 1 reports various measures of wage inequality as well as means. For male, average wages 
increased by 0.49 and 0.52 log points respectively from 1995 to 2002 and from 2002 to 2007. 
The increase in the latter period is higher. The increases for female are relatively lower than 
male especially in the latter period (0.48 and 0.36 log points respectively).  
Next, we focus on inequality measures. For male, the variance of log wages increased from 0.41 
in 1995 to 0.54 in 2002, and to 0.78 in 2007.
13 The differentials of log wages between 50
th and 
10
th percentiles increased from 0.72 to 0.87, while those between 90
th and 50
th percentiles 
increased from 0.60 to 0.68. Over 65 percent of the increase in the overall inequality as 
measured by the differential between 90
th and 10
th percentiles happened in the lower half. This 
pattern reversed completely in the second period. Around 60% of the increase in the 90-10 
percentile differential happened in the upper half. In words, the inequality increased mainly 
because the poor were left behind in the first period, in the second however, it is mainly because 
the rich got richer much faster. For female, inequality also increased in both periods. Unlike 
their male counterparts, the increase in inequality concentrated in the upper half in the first 
phase (1995-2002), but in the lower half in the second phase (2002-2007).  
 
The increase in inequality may be due to many reasons. Just to see the importance of residuals, 
we use the JMP approach to decompose the change of overall wage inequality into three parts, 
namely differences in observable quantities, differences in observable prices, and differences in 
                                                               
13 This is inconsistent with Meng et al, (2010). They find that variance inequality stopped rising in recent years. This may due to 
the fact that we include all labor incomes. If we don’t include the labor income other than wages and subsidies, the variance in 
2007 would be much lower. Other inequality measures are not very sensitive to this part of income however. 8 
 
unobservable quantities and prices.
14 The results are reported in table 2. It’s clear that price 
effect can explain the bulk of the increase at specific percentiles for both male and female. This 
finding is consistent with other researches on China, for example, Li, et. al, (2007) and Park et 
al, (2006). When we come to the change of differential between different percentiles, 
differences in unobservable quantities and prices play a very important role. For example, from 
1995 to 2002, it can explain 60-70 percent of the increase of the wage differentials for male.  
 
To see the importance of residual further, we predict residuals after running wage regressions 
for male and female by years. In terms of variance, the observables (education, experience, their 
full interactions, and region dummies) can at most explain one quarter of the total variance for 
both gender and for various years, with the explaining power varying a little bit at different 
positions of the distribution and in different years (the residual distribution is given by Figure 1). 
This claim is still true even after we controlled ownership, sector, and occupation dummies. 
Therefore, it’s not unexpected that after purging out the between-group differentials, the wage 
dispersions are still large. For male, the residual inequality patterns are very similar to the 
overall wage inequality. For female, the pattern is more similar to their male counterpart when 
considering residuals. In particular, the increase of residual inequality from 2002 to 2007 
concentrated on the upper half of the residual distribution, which is in contrast with the change 
of overall wage inequality during the same period.  
 
Residual inequality will be closely related the observables if its conditional distribution is 
dependent on these variables. To see this more clearly, we divide the sample of each year into 
24 education-experience cells for both male and female. We have 6 categories for education, 
namely primary and below, junior middle school, high school, technical school, professional 
school, college and above, and 4 categories for experience, namely below 10 years, 11-20 years, 
21-30 years, 31 years and above. The so-called conditional distribution is in essence the within 
group variations.  
 
Within the narrowly defined groups (education/experience cells), the variance of wages almost 
unanimously increased during the first period for males. The increasing trend remained for 
majority of these subgroups. The exceptions are subgroups of lower education and lower 
experience levels. Subgroups with education level lower than technical school (inclusive) and 
with less than 10 years of experience witness the largest decrease in within group inequality. At 
a given point of time, the within group variance vary with education and experience subgroups. 
In all three years, variances of wages are relatively larger for subgroups with lower education 
and lower experience levels. The above patterns for male are also applicable to female.  
 
Given these descriptive results, three points are worth mentioning regarding the within group 
inequalities. First, the patterns we’ve got here are at odds with both theoretical predictions and 
vast majority of empirical evidences in developed countries (see Lemieux (2006) for example). 
We believe this is mainly due to the fact that the wage determination mechanism in China is 
                                                               
14 JMP approach has shortcomings. It has been criticized for not taking into consideration of heteroskedasticity which is 
extremely important for the discussion of residual inequality. Further, it doesn’t consider explicitly the effect of composition 
change on residual inequality. It fact, this effect is included in the contribution due to differences in observable quantities. 9 
 
different from developed market economy. Under the traditional regime, significant share of 
labor is in public sector, where wages are set according to rigid rules, which is heavily 
dependent on education and experience (seniority). Note that the more educated and more 
experienced are more likely to be employed in public sector, it’s natural that their within group 
dispersion is lower. With the deepening of China’s economic reform, employers have more 
autonomy to set wages according to the employees’ ability other than education and experience. 
Therefore, we can expect the dispersions of higher skills would increase more.  
 
Second, the fact that wage dispersions of different groups are different means that changes in 
distribution of observable skills are potentially able to have effect on changes in residual 
inequality. This is exactly the so-called “composition effect”. From table 3 and table 4, it’s clear 
that the labor force became more educated and more experienced during first period. During the 
second period however, the trend is not as obvious. Another way to see this is to run regressions 
with year dummies as dependent variables. We pool the data of 2002 with that of 1995 and 2007 
respectively.  Let the dichotomous dependent variable equal to one if the individual belongs to 
the sample of 2002 and zero otherwise. The results reported in table 5 confirmed our conclusion 
that the skill composition did change significantly. The results also indicate that most of the 
change occurred in the first period, and the change for female are more significant. 
 
Finally, we only calculate within group variance at this moment. However, variance is only one 
measure of conditional distribution and it may be sensitive to extreme values. A more 
systematic way to describe the conditional distributions and their evolutions is to estimate 
series of quantile regressions. This point will be much clearer in the methodological section. 
Therefore, we postpone the discussion on quantile regressions and corresponding results to 
latter sections.  
 
3.  Decomposing Residual Wage Inequality 
 
We consider log form of individual wages. Furthermore, we assume that wages are determined 
according to a Mincer type wage equation:  
(1)  it it t it yX β ε =+  
Where yit is the log form of real wages, Xit stands for observable skills such as categories of 
potential experience (age-years of schooling-6), education levels, their interaction terms, and 
region dummies. εit is the error term. According to JMP, the residual is a product of some 
unobserved skills, eit, and the return to unobserved skills, pt. Taking into consideration of 
measurement error vit, Chay and Lee (2000), Lemieux (2006) considered the following error 
component model: 
(2)  it t it it p ev ε =+  
Residual wage inequality is simply the measured inequality in the residual εit. While may 
researches only focus on variance of εit,
15 we consider the functional of residual distributions, 
which can be thought of as more general measures of residual inequality. In fact, the 
                                                               
15 Lemieux (2006), Meng et al (2010), Cai et al (2010) for example. 10 
 
reweighting approach or the quantile regression based approach (see below) for accounting for 
the composition effect are applicable in very general settings. Now, consider the marginal 
distribution of the wage residual.  
(3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) | |, | ti Xi X X FF X t t d G X t t εε εε == = ∫  
The unconditional distribution of wage residual can be written as the conditional distribution of 
wage residuals given observed skills X at time t integrated over the whole distribution of X at 
time t. Equation (3) highlight the fact that residual distribution (inequality) may be different for 
different observed skills. Before moving forward, it’s worthwhile to discuss a little bit more 
about the dependence of wage dispersion (residual) on X. 
 
When we use variance as the inequality measure, the dependence of residual distribution on X 
means heteroskedasticity (See Lemieux, 2006b for more detailed discussion). The wide use of 
quantile regressions to estimate wage equations nowadays reflects researchers’ concern about 
the existence of it (Koenker and Bassett, 1982, Buchinsky, 1994, 1998, AKK, 2005). And in 
fact, various theories predict that the dispersion of wages should increase with education and 
potential experience. For example, Mincer (1974) pointed out differential investments in 
on-the-job training will cause the wage dispersion increase as a function of experience. Farber 
and Gibbons (1996) reach the same conclusion in a simple learning model. And using a random 
coefficient model, and in the spirit of Becker (1967) and Mincer (1997), Lemieux (2006a) 
shows that the variance of wages should be larger for more- than less-educated workers, and 
that the variance should increase more for more- than less-educated workers when the price of 
education increases. The evidence from China also suggests heteroskedasiticity (Xing, 2007, 
Luo, 2008). It’s worth noting however, that the pattern of wage dispersion within different 
education/experience cells is quite different from that of U.S. We’ll come back on this later. 
 
Next, assume that measurement error vit and unobserved skill eit do not change over time.
16 
Equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
(3’)  ( ) ( ) ( ) | |, | t i X t it it p X X FF p e v X t t d G X t t ε ε =+ = = ∫  
The increase in residual inequality will be solely due to rising skill price pt and the composition 
change of skills, i.e. the change in G(X|t). One central task of this paper is to determine to what 
extent does the increase in residual inequality can be attributable to rising prices or composition 
change.  
 
To account for the effect of composition change on residual distribution, it’s essential to 
construct a counterfactual distribution that keeps skill composition or skill price constant 
through the period under consideration. Consider the change of residual inequality from t=0 to 
t=1. What would the residual distribution would be like in time 1 if the skill composition is 
constant at time 0? The counterfactual distribution can be written as follows: 
17 
                                                               
16 This is a strong assumption. We will see to what extent does this assumption holds in section 5. For convenience, we pretend 
this assumption hold as Lemieux (2006b).  
17 We need to assume that the change of skill distributions from  ( ) |0 XX GX t = to  ( ) |1 XX GX t = have no effect on the 
conditional distribution of residuals, so that the counterfactual distribution can be written as equation (4).  11 
 
(4) 
( ) ( )
() () |
|0 , 1
          | , 1 | 0
Ci ci X p
Xt i t i t p X X
FF t t
Fp e v X t d G X t ε
εε == =
=+ = = ∫
 
Note that the counterfactual distribution is simply the conditional distribution (or skill price) of 
time 1 integrated over the skill distribution of time 0. Based on this observation, two approaches 
are proposed to construct such counterfactuals.  
 
The first approach is based on quantile regression and re-sampling. By running quantile 
regressions for different quantiles of time 1, we can have a detailed description of the 
conditional distribution. The estimated skill price structure (conditional distribution) can be 
applied to skill distribution of time 0. This can be done using a re-sampling method proposed by 
Machado and Mata (2005), or simply by multiplying the quantile coefficient matrix with the 
data matrix as proposed by Angrist et al, (2004).
18 As is clear in the estimation process, this 
approach can estimate the conditional distribution explicitly, with some risk of putting strong 
restrictions on the structure of conditional distributions. Meanwhile, by using re-sampling 
method or its equivalent, no effort is needed to estimate the composition change parametrically.  
 
An alternative approach originally proposed by Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemiuex (1996) is just like 
a mirror image of the above one. The insight of the DFL approach is that counterfactual 
distribution can be estimated by reweighting the residual sample of time 1 using the following 
weight (see Dinardo, et. al, (1996) for details), 
(5)  ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr 0| / 1 Pr 0| tX tX θ == −=
 
Pooling the data of time 0 and time 1 together, Pr(t=0|X) can be estimated using the logit or 
probit models. Using the predicted probability, the weight can be calculated for each 
observation (predicted residual) in time 1,  l() l() ( ) ˆ Pr 0| / 1 Pr 0| ii i tX tX θ == −= . It can then be 
used to estimate the counterfactual density and to calculate various counterfactual inequality 
measures.  
 
It’s clear that the parametric model and its predictions are used to estimate the composition 
change explicitly, and the skill price of time 1 is just hiding in the residual data of time 1. To be 
more intuitive, consider the skill compositions of year 1995 and 2002. With the gradual 
expansion of higher education, we can expect more college graduates in the 2002 sample than 
in 1995 (Li, et al, 2008). Using the residual wage sample of 2002 to construct the counterfactual 
holding skill composition at the 1995 level, we should give college graduates less weight. Note 
that the probability of a graduates being in the 1995 sample will be relatively lower than that in 
the 2002 sample holding other characteristics constant. The weight of an observation with 
college degree will be less than one. 
 
These two approaches, DFL and MM, are conceptually similar. For example, Autor, Katz, and 
                                                               
18 To simulate the actual distribution and construct counterfactual distributions, Angrist,et al, (2004) show that greater precision 
can be obtained by multiplying the entire g(x) distribution by the quantile regression coefficient matrix. Therefore, we use the 
latter approach instead of the re-sampling approach proposed by Machado and Mata (2005). Autor et al, (2005) also use the 
former approach. To be concise, we sometime call the quantile regression based approach MM approach.  12 
 
Kearny (2005) extended the MM approach to investigate composition effect and price effect in 
the change of wage inequality. To compare their results to Lemieux (2005), who used 
reweighting approach, they find its substantive differences with the latter are not consequential 
for their conclusions (They do draw different conclusions, but not because of different 
methods). As neither one can claim global superiority over the other, we use them both. We 
would like to point out at this earlier stage that the results from these two approaches are quite 
similar. As the MM approach gives more volatile results and is more time consuming, after 
presenting the benchmark results, we rely more on the DFL reweighting approach to do 
decomposition exercises.  
 
Finally, we define a real-valued functional v(F). v(.) can be thought of as rules to map different 
distributions (Fs) to different real numbers. For example, the v(.) can be a rule to calculate the 
Gini coefficients of different distributions. It can also be a rule to calculate many other 
statistical measures of F, such as variance, Theil indices, percentiles, the differential between 
90
th and 10
th percentiles, etc. Having constructed the counterfactual distribution of residuals, 
and letting ( ) ( ) 00 i vv F ε = , ( ) ( ) 11 i vv F ε = and  ( ) ( ) CC i vv F ε = , it’s straight forward to 
decompose the change of any distribution statistics  ( ) vF into two parts: 
(6)  [] [] 10 1 0 X P
vv
cc vv vv vv −= − + − = ∆ + ∆  
The term in the first bracket is the change due to composition effect (∆X), while that in the 
second bracket is the change due to skill price effect (∆P). 
 
4.  Counterfactual Residual Inequality and Decomposition Results 
 
4.1 Conditional Distribution and Quantile Regression Based Decomposition 
We’ve already seen how within group variance varies among different groups in section 2. 
To see how the conditional distribution of residual wages depends on observable 
characteristics in a more systematic way, we estimate quantile regressions for both 
genders and for each year at various conditional quantiles including (1, 1.5, 2, …, 98, 98.5, 
99). If the conditional distributions of wage residuals don’t depend on observable 
characteristics, there shouldn’t be systematic difference in coefficients among different 
percentiles. The results from quantile regressions indicate that this is not the case. In 
particular, we estimate returns to various levels of education and experience.
19 The results 
for male and for different years are reported in Figure 2a to Figure 2c. In Figure 2a, one 
obvious feature is that the coefficients in lower quantile regressions are higher than those in 
upper quantile regressions. Therefore, the coefficient-quantile profiles are downward sloping 
for all the variables. This pattern changed significantly in 2002. For lower levels of educations, 
the relationship between coefficients in different quanitle regressions and quantiles become 
inverse U shaped. For higher levels of education (professional college, and college graduates), 
the relationships are still monotonic and downward sloping, but to a lesser extent. The same is 
                                                               
19 For ease of interpretation, we do not consider the interaction terms between education and experience here. But in 
constructing the counterfactual using quantile regressions, we do include interaction terms.  13 
 
also true for experience dummies. In 2007, the coefficient-quantile relationships become even 
more flatter. The results for female show similar patterns, and to save space, they are not 
reported.  
 
Again, the evolution of quantile regression results indicate that the conditional distribution 
(skill price) changed dramatically from 1995 to 2007. Meanwhile, the systematic differentials 
between different quantiles confirm that the conditional residual distributions at various levels 
of observables are not necessarily identical, and therefore composition change may also have 
substantative effect on the overall residual inequality. 
 
Next, we construct conterfactual residual distributions to evaluate the relative importance of 
price effect and composition effect. Take the counterfactual with 2002 skill price and 1995 
composition for example. First, we estimate quantile regressions using the 2002 data. In all the 
quantile regressions, residual wage is the dependent variable and education dummies, 
experience category dummies, their interactions, and region dummies are regressors. The 
quantile regressions are run at the (1, 1.5, 2, …, 98, 98.5, 99)th percentiles. After estimation 
of each quantile regression, the coefficients are applied to the 1995 data (using out-of-sample 
prediction). As we run quantile regressions 197 times, the 1995 data are used 197 times to 
predict residual wages. All these predicted residuals are then used to estimate the couterfactual 
residual distributions. The main results are reported in Figure 3. In figure 3a, the blue line is the 
counterfactual distribution with the combination of 2002 skill price (quantile regression 
coefficients) and 1995 composition. Similarly, the green dash line is the counterfactual 
combining 2002 skill price and 2007 skill composition. These two lines almost overlap with the 
factual distribution for year 2002. Notice that all these three lines are based on skill price of year 
2002, and the only differences are due to composition change. The results indicate that 
composition effects are very small. For female, we have the same conclusion. 
 
4.2 DFL Decomposition 
Next, we also apply the reweighting approach to estimate factual and counterfactual 
residual kernel densities. The predicted probabilities from the above probit models are 
used to calculate the weight according to equation (5). We have two counterfactuals and 
one factual residual distribution. The two counterfactuals are constructed using the 
residual data of 2002. By reweighting the observations according to composition change 
from 1995 to 2002, and from 2002 to 2007, we are holding the price of unobservable skills 
constant at the 2002 level and letting the skill composition vary.  
 
It turns out that the composition effect can explain little of the change in residual 
inequality. Figure 4 indicates that the counterfactual distributions for 1995 and 2007 are 
very close to the factual one in 2002. This means that the composition change have little 
effect on the change of residual inequality. This is true for both genders.  
 
An alternative way to see the role of price effect and composition effect is to see the 
change of percentiles. Take male between 1995 and 2002 for example. In Figure 5a, we 
plot the differential between 1995 and 2002 different percentiles. The solid line is the 14 
 
differential of factual percentiles, which can be thought of as overall change. The long 
dash line depicts the differential between the factual percentiles of 2002 and the 
counterfactual percentiles of 1995, which is due to composition change. The dash-dot line 
depicts the differential between the factual and counterfactual percentiles of 1995, which 
is due to price change. The latter one is very close to the factual differential, indicating 
the predominant role of price change for enlarging residual inequality. This composition 
effect is positive at lower percentiles and negative at higher percentiles. Thus 
composition change tends to decrease residual inequality. Although the composition 
effect plays a minor role on the whole, it seems to have much larger effect at the very low 
end of the distribution. This is also true for female during the period between 1995 and 
2002. In the second period, the changing pattern of the overall inequality is different from 
the first period, which we already discussed at the data description section. The role of 
price effect and composition effect didn’t change much however, with composition 
change playing an even more minor role. 
 
To see the robustness of our results, we calculate counterfactual inequality measures 
using different combination of skill prices and skill compositions. In table 6, each column 
is under the price of a specific year, and each row is under the skill composition of a 
specific year. Take the element at the first column and second row for example. The 
inequality measure is calculated using the counterfactual density with skill price of 1995 
and composition pattern of 2002. And so on so forth. Therefore, the change along the 
diagonal is the factual change, while the change of inequality along columns is solely due 
to composition change and the change along rows is due to price effect. Obviously, price 
change almost always explains off the overall change. Composition change plays a minor 
role, if not negligible. 
 
5.  Caveat and Explanations 
 
5.1 Change of Unobserved Skills or Measurement Error? 
 
In section 2, we make two assumptions. The first is that the distribution of unobserved skills 
within specific groups doesn’t change overtime. The second is that measurement error doesn’t 
change either. Whether these assumptions hold or to what extent they hold have strong 
implications for the interpretation of our results. It’s clear that we can’t separate out the price 
effect if the distribution of unobserved skill (eit) or (and) that of the measurement error (vit) 
change overtime. 
 
With education expansion, it’s natural to worry that unobserved skill distributions for well 
defined education-experience groups change overtime. As mentioned in the background section, 
there was a significant post-secondary education expansion in 1999 and thereafter. As the 
number of new students admitted to colleges or universities increased, we expect that the 
unobserved skill distributions within both high school graduates and college or university 
graduates will change accordingly, and this will contaminate the price effect. 
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Surprisingly, we haven’t found that within college inequality increased due to the change in 
unobserved skill dispersion, neither have we found skill distribution change for high school 
graduates. In figure 3, we calculate inequality measures (variance, the difference between the 
90
th and 50
th percentiles, and that between the 50
th and 10
th percentiles) using a 1/5 random 
sample from 1% census data in 2005. Given that much more high school graduates are admitted 
to college or universities, we expect there will be much more heterogeneity within those groups, 
and therefore the within group inequalities will increase. However both for male (Figure 6a) 
and female (Figure 6b), we haven’t found obvious increase in inequalities for the younger 
groups. Although the composition change is substantial (see figure 1 in Li and Xing, 2010), 
there are no obvious discontinuities in the inequalities. In fact, the inequality measures are 
lower for those with few market experiences. For high school graduates, within group 
inequality is lower for the younger groups, but there’re no discontinuities as we expect. As 
Figure 6 uses only one cross sectional data set, we can’t separate the expansion effect from the 
age or cohort effect. According to human capital theory, the within group inequality for younger 
workers is lower. Therefore the younger age effect may counter balance the expansion effect. 
However, if this is true, the change in unobservable skill distributions will have little effect on 
our decomposition also. The reason is that even in 2007, those groups that affected by the 
expansion policy are still young. The change in unobservable skill distribution needs time to 
have effect. 
 
In Figure 7, we perform similar exercises using the three CHIP surveys. As the samples are 
small, we put the male and female sample together. But still, the figures have more volatility, 
especially for the college samples. Although being volatile, the inequality-experience profiles 
for year 2002 and for 2007 are quite similar, especially for the younger groups. For those older 
groups, within group inequalities in 2007 are larger than that in 2002 and than that in 1995. Yet 
for those younger groups, it’s hard to say that college or university within group inequalities 
have increased because of expansion. It’s also hard to say that within group inequalities for 
younger high school graduate has declined. Therefore, evidences both from the census data and 
from CHIP data show that the change in unobservable skill distributions won’t be a major 
problem that will contaminate our decomposition.  
 
As for measurement errors, it’s hard to judge whether it becomes more manifested or not. 
However, the fact that these three surveys were conducted by the same research team alleviates 
this concern. Furthermore, there seems no significant change in the volatility of those 
inequality-experience profiles in Figure 7.  
 
5.2 Potential Explanations 
 
The basic point of our strategy to uncover the underlying reasons for the rise in residual 
inequality is to explore the regional variations. To do that, we first run wage regressions for 
different years as in section 3 and 4. Using the predicted residuals, we calculate the residual 
inequality measures at the city level. These residual inequality measures are then used as 
dependent variables to be explained. According to the background section, we consider three 
independent variables. To reflect the effect of ownership restructuring, the soe variable is the 16 
 
fraction of people in the state owned sector. A college share variable is constructed to reflect the 
proportion of people with college or university degrees. And finally, to reflect the possible 
effect of globalization on inequality, we calculate the proportion of export in regional GDP. For 
reason of data availability, the third variable is at provincial level, while the first two are 
constructed at the city level. A nice feature of the CHIP data is that many cities participated in 
all the three surveys. Therefore, we can construct a panel dataset at the city level and estimate 
fixed effect models. To keep the panel balanced, we drop those cities that participated in the 
survey less than three times. There are 33 cities that appear in all the surveys.  
 
The results are reported in Table 7. Panel A is the results for males. As expected, most of the 
coefficients for soe are significantly negative. As more and more labor are allocated into the 
private sector, the residual inequality increased. According to our decomposition results, the 
rise in residual inequality is mainly due to price effect. The results here indicate that the 
ownership restructuring increased skill prices. This result is consistent with existing literature 
that studying the evolutions of return to educations. For example, Zhang et al, (2005) find that 
returns increased from 1988 to 2001, Li and Ding (2003) also find this pattern. The fact that we 
are looking into residual inequality differentiate our research from theirs.  
 
By considering the two periods (from 1995 to 2002, and from 2002 to 2007) separately, we find 
that ownership restructuring has more significant effect during the first period. This is 
consistent with the fact that the most radical change happened in the late 1990s. In addition, by 
considering the upper half inequality and lower half inequality separately, we find that the 
ownership restructuring has more effect on the lower half.  
 
As emphasized in section 2, a relative new phenomenon of urban wage structure is that majority 
of the residual inequality happened at the upper half. One important finding in Table 7 is that the 
trade variable (exp/gdp)) has significant effects on the upper half of the residual distributions 
during the second period. Therefore the results here not only confirm our hypothesis that 
China’s entry into WTO has effect on urban (residual) wage inequality, but also explain (at least 
partly) why the inequality on the upper half rises more rapidly from 2002 to 2007. Therefore, 
our results here shed new lights on how globalization affects inequality from a very different 
dimension.  
 
In most of the cases, coefficients for variable college share are not significant. This reinforced 
our conclusion that the higher education expansion has little effect on our estimation and 
interpretation of the decomposition results. Most of the general pattern for males is also true for 
female. One major exception is that exp/gdp variable has significant effect on the change of the 
lower half of residual distributions (panel B of table 7). The effect is positive but not significant 
for the upper halves. Another exception is that SOE variable has more significant effect for the 
upper half instead of the lower ones.  
 
In panel C and D, we try another way to construct inequalities at the city level. Instead of run 
wage regression for the whole sample for particular years, we run wage regressions for each 
city and for different years. City level residuals are predicted and residual inequality measures 17 
 
are constructed after that. Ownership restructuring and exports are still important factors that 
driving up residual inequalities. And the patterns in C and D are similar to those in panel A and 
B. Other variables are not significant any more, therefore are not reported. Finally, we also do 
exercises without requiring a balanced panel data. The sample increases a lot. There’s no 
essential difference between the balanced panel data results and the unbalanced ones, however. 
This makes us more confident about our results. 
 
5.3 Labor Market Segmentation and Residual Inequality 
 
Existing researches have shown that China’s labor market is segmented (Knight and Song, 
2008 for example). This will have a strong implication for the interpretation of price effect in 
residual inequality. Given the existence of labor market segmentation, individuals with 
identical characteristics both observable and unobservable, may have significantly different 
earnings simply due to the fact that they are in different occupations, industries, or ownerships. 
Therefore, the price effect we’ve established above includes both real price of unobservable 
skill and rents between different sectors. However, it’s more realistic to say that individuals’ 
sector affiliation is often closely related to education levels and unobservable ability. Therefore, 
it’s notoriously difficult to separate out the rent effect from the real price effect.  
 
The exercise we’ve done here is to further include the industry, occupation, and ownership 
dummies when predicting the residuals.
20 As already been shown, residual inequalities are still 
large even after further controlling these variables (see Table 1). In the decomposition results 
for male reported in Table 6, price change plays a major, if not dominant, role. Composition 
change plays a more important, but still minor, role. The composition effect is larger in the 
period from 2002 to 2007. The above conclusions are also true for female, but with some 
irregularities. The results in part B of Table 6 highlight the fact that different sectors have 
different wage dispersions, and that there have been significant restructuring in terms of 
ownership, industry, and occupations. Fully accounting for this requires more efforts and spaces, 
we leave this for future research. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The time from 1995 to 2007 is a very important period for China’s economic reform and 
development. The urban sector changed dramatically. In terms of wage income, not only the 
differential between different well defined population increased, but also that within groups are 
increased. Theoretically, this increase in residual inequality however can’t be simply regarded 
as rise in skill prices. However, by using the DFL reweighting and quantile regression based 
approaches, we confirm that the rise in urban residual inequality is mainly due to price effect.  
                                                               
20 To what extent the segmentation is correlated with unobservable ability also determines how far we should go when defining 
residuals (In cases where segmentation is perfectly correlated with observable characteristics such as education and experience, 
the discussion here will be trivial.) Two extreme cases will help to illustrate this point. If segmentation is perfectly correlated 
with unobservable skills, the seemingly segmentation is just a result of different individuals selecting or being selected by 
different sectors. In this case, segmentation is just a superficial phenomenon and will not be a concern at all. Another extreme 
case is that segmentation is totally uncorrelated with unobservable skills, and the differences between different sectors are just 




The explanations for the rise in skill price are fundamentally different from those for western 
countries, however. The later emphasize skill biased technological change. The reasons that we 
have found for China are mainly due to China’s transitional feature. We emphasize two. One is 
ownership restructuring. The other is China’s integration into the world market. Regarding the 
first, our results are consistent with most of the existing research that studying prices of 
observable characteristics. The second add new evidence on the relationship between China’s 
openness and urban wage structure, by emphasizing the structural change brought by China’s 
entry into WTO, and by emphasizing its bigger impact on upper half of residual distributions.  
 
Considering the major expansion higher education, the results with little composition effect 
really surprised us. What also surprised us is that there’s no obvious evidence showing that the 
unobserved skill distributions within particular groups changed after the expansion. My 
conjecture is that these effects need time to show up. Those who are affected by the expansion 
are still young in our samples. According to human capital theories, as people gaining more 
experience, their income level will diverge. To see the full effect of the expansion needs more 
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Table 1 Wage inequality and residual inequality 
  1995 2002 2007    1995 2002 2007 
 Male    Female 
real  log  wage          
Mean  8.63 9.12 9.64    8.40    8.88    9.24 
90-10  1.31 1.55 1.88    1.52    1.69    2.05 
50-10  0.72 0.87 1.00    0.89    0.91    1.14 
90-50  0.60 0.68 0.88    0.63    0.78    0.92 
Variance   0.41  0.54  0.78    0.61   0.59   1.05 
residual of log wage (Residual I)               
90-10  1.14 1.37 1.58    1.32    1.44    1.80 
50-10  0.60 0.77 0.86    0.75    0.81    1.00 
90-50  0.54 0.60 0.73    0.57    0.63    0.81 
variance  0.33 0.42 0.61    0.51    0.46    0.83 
Residual  with  more  controls  (Residual  II)          
90-10  1.11 1.29 1.45    1.23    1.38    1.50 
50-10  0.57 0.70 0.75    0.69    0.76    0.78 
90-50  0.53 0.59 0.70    0.54    0.62    0.71 
variance  0.31 0.38 0.46    0.42    0.40    0.47 
 
 
Table 2 Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition 
 Male    Female 
1995-2002  T Q P U    T Q P U 
mean  0.490 0.049 0.442 -0.001    0.482 0.090 0.393 -0.001 
p10  0.374 0.099 0.363 -0.088    0.424 0.142 0.343 -0.061 
p50  0.528 0.046 0.458 0.023    0.439 0.066 0.392 -0.018 
p90  0.614 0.043 0.494 0.077    0.593 0.091 0.464 0.037 
d9010 0.240  -0.056  0.130  0.165    0.169  -0.051  0.122  0.098 
d5010 0.154  -0.053  0.095  0.112    0.015  -0.076  0.049  0.043 
d9050  0.086 -0.003 0.035 0.053    0.154 0.025 0.073 0.056 
2002-2007             
mean  0.521 0.089 0.432 -0.001    0.356 0.096 0.260 -0.001 
p10  0.368 0.044 0.399 -0.075    0.197 0.069 0.258 -0.131 
p50  0.500 0.065 0.424 0.010    0.422 0.106 0.263 0.054 
p90  0.692 0.120 0.478 0.094    0.555 0.118 0.285 0.152 
d9010  0.324 0.076 0.079 0.168    0.358 0.048 0.027 0.282 
d5010  0.132 0.021 0.025 0.085    0.225 0.036 0.004 0.185 
d9050  0.192 0.055 0.054 0.083    0.133 0.012 0.023 0.098 
Note:  
T = Total difference 
Q = Contribution of differences in observable quantities 
P = Contribution of differences in observable prices 






Table 3 Within-group variance and composition change, male 
  Within-group variance    Labor force share 
         change            change   
  1995  2002  2007   95-02  02-07    1995  2002  2007   95-02  02-07 
EDU=1                        
0-10  0.76 1.87 0.32    1.11 -1.56    0.14 0.19 0.15    0.04 -0.04 
11-20  0.35 0.44 0.81    0.09 0.37    0.53 0.28 0.22    -0.25 -0.06 
21-30  0.57 0.43 0.59    -0.14 0.16    1.86 0.78 0.55    -1.08 -0.24 
31+  0.83 0.44 1.03    -0.40 0.59    1.91 1.29 1.23    -0.62 -0.06 
EDU=2                         
0-10  0.78 0.90 0.52    0.13 -0.39    3.78 1.68 1.48    -2.09 -0.20 
11-20  0.52 0.86 0.83    0.33 -0.03    6.55 4.93 3.10    -1.61 -1.83 
21-30  0.27 0.47 0.65    0.20 0.18    12.73 8.71  6.30   -4.02  -2.40 
31+  0.61 0.49 1.17    -0.12 0.68    4.91 8.63  10.05    3.73  1.42 
EDU=3                         
0-10  0.48 0.69 0.57    0.21 -0.12    5.29 3.92 2.65    -1.36 -1.27 
11-20  0.33 0.57 0.61    0.24 0.04    9.22 6.73 4.95    -2.49 -1.77 
21-30  0.29 0.38 0.81    0.09 0.44    5.59 12.20  10.11   6.61  -2.09 
31+  0.44 0.44 0.80    0.00 0.36    2.45 3.63 7.00    1.17  3.37 
EDU=4                         
0-10  0.38 0.69 0.52    0.31 -0.17    3.82 2.19 2.30    -1.64 0.11 
11-20  0.26 0.35 0.62    0.09 0.28    3.82 2.54 3.04    -1.28 0.50 
21-30  0.16 0.27 0.47    0.11 0.20    5.11 2.99 2.62    -2.12 -0.37 
31+  0.42 0.49 0.88    0.07 0.39    3.50 3.01 2.52    -0.50 -0.49 
EDU=5                         
0-10  0.35 0.47 0.61    0.12 0.13    3.50 4.26 4.24    0.76 -0.03 
11-20  0.20 0.34 0.46    0.14 0.13    6.20 7.25 6.77    1.05 -0.48 
21-30  0.22 0.25 0.35    0.03 0.10    6.13 7.16 7.46    1.03  0.30 
31+  0.23 0.28 0.56    0.05 0.28    2.41 4.82 5.85    2.42  1.03 
EDU=6                         
0-10  0.39 0.42 0.55    0.03 0.13    2.12 2.77 3.87    0.65  1.10 
11-20  0.22 0.36 0.54    0.14 0.18    2.33 5.42 5.98    3.09  0.56 
21-30  0.14 0.29 0.38    0.15 0.09    3.46 2.71 5.22    -0.75 2.51 















Table 4 Within-group variance and composition change, female 
  Within-group variance    Labor force share 
         change            change   
  1995  2002  2007    95-02  02-07   1995 2002 2007    95-02  02-07 
EDU=1                      
0-10  0.54   0.82   0.46     0.29  -0.36    1.00  0.66  0.42     -0.34   -0.23 
11-20  0.88   0.55   1.14     -0.33  0.59    1.81  0.54  0.41     -1.26   -0.13 
21-30  0.86   0.27   1.63     -0.59  1.36    2.77  0.89  0.84     -1.87   -0.06 
31+  2.58   0.55   1.67     -2.03  1.12    0.58  0.28  0.65     -0.30   0.37 
EDU=2                      
0-10  0.70   0.67   0.86     -0.03  0.19    5.68  3.27  2.59     -2.41   -0.68 
11-20  0.49   0.62   0.67     0.13  0.05    9.92  6.74  4.25     -3.19   -2.49 
21-30  0.54   0.45   0.91     -0.09  0.46    14.69  8.24  6.68     -6.45   -1.56 
31+  1.68   0.41   2.77     -1.27  2.36    2.10  2.66  4.83     0.56   2.17 
EDU=3                      
0-10  0.58   0.62   0.68     0.04  0.06    6.42  4.36  3.03     -2.06   -1.33 
11-20  0.34   0.54   0.68     0.19  0.14    13.51  9.44  6.84     -4.07   -2.61 
21-30  0.35   0.44   0.81     0.09  0.37    5.56  14.67  12.97     9.12   -1.71 
31+  3.38   0.41   1.48     -2.97  1.07    0.68  1.72  4.70     1.04   2.98 
EDU=4                      
0-10  0.71   0.62   0.67     -0.09  0.06    4.87  4.07  3.02     -0.80   -1.06 
11-20  0.30   0.48   0.43     0.18  -0.05    5.07  4.10  3.99     -0.97   -0.11 
21-30  0.34   0.38   0.70     0.03  0.32    5.63  4.95  3.79     -0.68   -1.15 
31+  1.32   0.70   2.17     -0.63  1.47    1.98  2.03  2.38     0.04   0.35 
EDU=5                      
0-10  0.36   0.55   0.73     0.18  0.19    3.23  6.52  6.65     3.30   0.13 
11-20  0.23   0.30   0.41     0.06  0.12    4.52  8.60  9.36     4.07   0.76 
21-30  0.17   0.29   0.59     0.12  0.30    4.07  6.05  7.56     1.99   1.51 
31+  0.49   0.33   1.01     -0.16  0.68    0.75  2.21  3.02     1.46   0.80 
EDU=6                      
0-10  0.43   0.56   0.57     0.13  0.01    1.74  2.54  4.47     0.81   1.93 
11-20  0.15   0.66   0.40     0.51  -0.26    1.33  3.46  4.50     2.13   1.04 
21-30  0.17   0.23   0.33     0.06  0.10    1.51  1.53  2.22     0.02   0.69 




Table 5 Probit Models 
  In year 2002=1/otherwise=0 
  Male     Female  
  1995 vs 2002  2002 vs 2007    1995 vs 2002  2002 vs 2007 
Middle school  -0.654**  0.022    -0.080  -0.161 
  (0.297) (0.284)   (0.154) (0.183) 
High school  -0.344  0.202    0.019  -0.069 
  (0.293) (0.277)   (0.151) (0.180) 
Technical school  -0.504*  -0.059    0.146  -0.128 
  (0.296) (0.280)   (0.153) (0.180) 
3 year college  -0.036  -0.027    0.697***  -0.322* 
  (0.294) (0.275)   (0.153) (0.175) 
4 year college and above  0.008  -0.233    0.492***  -0.642*** 
  (0.298) (0.277)   (0.166) (0.181) 
Experience_11-20 -0.551  0.105    -0.450**  -0.087 
  (0.345) (0.349)   (0.192) (0.247) 
Experience_21-30 -0.689**  0.135    -0.417**  -0.250 
  (0.307) (0.302)   (0.175) (0.214) 
Experience 30+  -0.391  0.035    -0.129  -0.722*** 
  (0.303) (0.288)   (0.249) (0.259) 
MiddleXexper11-20 0.872**  0.120    0.548***  0.232 
  (0.356) (0.364)   (0.207) (0.263) 
MiddleXexper21-30 0.948***  0.016    0.400**  0.261 
  (0.318) (0.317)   (0.189) (0.231) 
Middle Xexper31+  1.248***  -0.141    0.656**  0.408 
  (0.315) (0.303)   (0.270) (0.277) 
HighXexper11-20 0.541  -0.156    0.465**  0.047 
  (0.351) (0.357)   (0.204) (0.259) 
HighXexper21-30  1.363*** -0.254    1.260*** 0.108 
  (0.315) (0.310)   (0.188) (0.226) 
High  Xexper31+  0.831*** -0.656**   0.970*** -0.035 
  (0.315) (0.298)   (0.283) (0.277) 
TechnicalXexper11-20 0.641* -0.215   0.429**  -0.097 
  (0.358) (0.363)   (0.210) (0.262) 
TechnicalXexper21-30  0.699** -0.063    0.447** 0.229 
  (0.320) (0.318)   (0.193) (0.231) 
TechnicalXexper31+ 0.650**  0.116    0.270  0.511* 
  (0.317) (0.304)   (0.271) (0.280) 
3yearcolXexper11-20 0.525 -0.106    0.410**  0.022 
  (0.352) (0.355)   (0.207) (0.255) 
3yearcolXexper21-30 0.663**  -0.204    0.222 0.108 
  (0.316) (0.309)   (0.193) (0.224) 
3yearcolXexper31+ 0.704**  -0.151    0.354  0.583** 
  (0.315) (0.297)   (0.279) (0.274) 
4yearcolXexper11-20 0.915**  0.009   0.810***  0.245 
  (0.358) (0.357)   (0.228) (0.263) 
4yearcolXexper21-30 0.369 -0.359    0.188 0.329 
  (0.323) (0.313)   (0.221) (0.242) 
4yearcol Xexper31+  0.025  0.041    -0.269  0.686** 
  (0.322) (0.304)   (0.318) (0.310) 
Central -0.020  -0.018    -0.033  -0.038 
  (0.030) (0.030)   (0.033) (0.033) 
Eastern -0.030  -0.312***  -0.002  -0.310*** 
  (0.030) (0.028)   (0.032) (0.031) 
Constant 0.077  -0.072    -0.428***  0.153 
  (0.288) (0.270)   (0.143) (0.170) 
Pseudo  R2  0.039 0.025   0.057 0.027 




Table 6 Decomposition results 
    Male         Female    
  Price of unobserved skill of     Price of unobserved skill of  
 1995  2002  2007    1995  2002  2007 
A: Residual I          
quant90-10          
1995  1.14 1.41 1.57   1.32 1.47 1.74 
2002  1.11 1.37 1.57   1.28 1.44 1.73 
2007  1.12 1.38 1.58   1.30 1.47 1.80 
quant50-10          
1995  0.60 0.80 0.85   0.75 0.84 0.96 
2002  0.57 0.77 0.86   0.71 0.81 0.95 
2007  0.57 0.76 0.86   0.72 0.83 1.00 
quant90-50          
1995  0.54 0.61 0.72   0.57 0.63 0.78 
2002  0.53 0.60 0.72   0.57 0.63 0.78 
2007  0.55 0.61 0.73   0.58 0.64 0.81 
Variance          
1995  0.33 0.46 0.58   0.51 0.48 0.76 
2002  0.32 0.42 0.60   0.48 0.46 0.74 
2007  0.33 0.40 0.61   0.57 0.45 0.83 
B: Residual II          
quant90-10          
1995  1.11 1.28 1.38   1.23 1.40 1.52 
2002  1.16 1.29 1.40   1.17 1.38 1.50 
2007  1.14 1.36 1.45   1.16 1.43 1.50 
quant50-10          
1995  0.57 0.69 0.73   0.69 0.76 0.70 
2002  0.61 0.70 0.73   0.65 0.76 0.77 
2007  0.79 0.73 0.75   0.73 0.79 0.78 
quant90-50          
1995  0.53 0.58 0.65   0.54 0.64 0.82 
2002  0.55 0.59 0.67   0.52 0.62 0.73 
2007  0.34 0.63 0.70   0.43 0.64 0.71 
Variance          
1995  0.31 0.34 0.34   0.42 0.37 0.41 
2002  0.63 0.38 0.40   0.33 0.40 0.43 









Table 7 Explain the rising residual inequality  
  Dependent=residual inequality in terms of  
 Variance  quant90-50  Quant50-10 
  95-07 95-02 02-07 95-07 95-02 02-07 95-07 95-02 02-07 
A :   M a l e            
soe  -0.509**  -0.720*** 0.226  -0.403*** -0.301*** -0.093  -1.015*** -1.380*** -0.788 
 (0.216)  (0.236)  (0.652)  (0.103) (0.089) (0.267) (0.298) (0.461) (0.918) 
College  share  0.098 -0.126  0.365 0.024 0.318 -0.398  0.456 1.193 0.793 
 (0.502)  (0.530)  (0.890)  (0.239) (0.201) (0.365) (0.691) (1.035) (1.253) 
Exp/gdp  1.296** -0.134  2.169** 0.424*  0.340  0.886** -0.089  0.352  0.003 
 (0.489)  (0.780)  (0.953)  (0.233) (0.296) (0.390) (0.673) (1.524) (1.342) 
Constant  0.465*  0.937*** -0.154  0.719*** 0.563*** 0.628*** 1.264*** 1.263**  1.018 
 (0.272)  (0.276)  (0.531)  (0.129) (0.105) (0.218) (0.374) (0.539) (0.748) 
R2_W  0.219 0.294 0.180 0.304 0.408 0.196 0.237 0.358 0.051 
R2_B  0.001 0.027 0.000 0.083 0.010 0.066 0.014 0.001 0.002 
R2_O  0.015 0.116 0.005 0.141 0.066 0.060 0.158 0.107 0.008 
N  99 66 66 99 66 66 99 66 66 
B :   F e m a l e            
soe  -0.321 -0.143 -0.407 -0.503***  -0.273**  -0.423 -0.604*  -0.418 -0.326 
 (0.281)  (0.350)  (0.886)  (0.122) (0.103) (0.413) (0.325) (0.314) (1.067) 
College  share  1.047 1.254 1.119 0.325 0.449*  0.449 0.208 0.680 0.136 
 (0.649)  (0.872)  (1.307)  (0.281) (0.257) (0.609) (0.752) (0.783) (1.573) 
Exp/gdp  2.008***  1.255 2.365*  0.295 0.231 0.349 1.740**  -0.226  2.843* 
 (0.616)  (1.216)  (1.212)  (0.267) (0.358) (0.565) (0.714) (1.093) (1.460) 
Constant  0.086 0.066 0.023 0.720***  0.555***  0.650**  0.749**  0.897***  0.464 
 (0.272)  (0.349)  (0.588)  (0.118) (0.103) (0.274) (0.315) (0.314) (0.707) 
R2_W  0.293 0.125 0.273 0.435 0.431 0.161 0.198 0.182 0.185 
R2_B  0.003 0.000 0.017 0.182 0.303 0.109 0.000 0.009 0.000 
R2_O  0.035 0.003 0.037 0.330 0.358 0.116 0.016 0.067 0.006 
N  99 66 66 99 66 66 99 66 66 
C :   M a l e            
soe  -0.343*  -0.581*** 0.508  -0.331*** -0.450*** 0.153  -0.575*** -0.807*** 0.031 
Exp/gdp  1.306***  -0.121  2.157***  0.420*  0.033 0.714 0.251 -0.096  0.784 
D :   F e m a l e            
soe  -0.077 -0.028 0.135  -0.325**  -0.308**  0.098  -0.335**  -0.271 0.209 
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Figure 7c Within-group Inequalities in Three CHIP Surveys (High School Graduates) 
 